Should the US bomb Iran? part 2
Personally, I do not think the US should bomb Iran.
Stating my opinion upfront, I do not think the US should bomb Iran. There are any number of reasons why, but I detail four below.
Knowledge is infinite,
Regime change is neigh impossible,
The potential for retaliation, and
Diplomacy with Iran has proved effective.
Building off my prior post (linked below) on what has happened thus far during the Israel/Iran conflict and why the US may get involved, today we look at the possible ramifications of the conflict to try and come to a conclusion as to whether or not the US should actively engage in Iran.
Infrastructure can be rebuilt and knowledge is eternal
The best argument for the US engaging and striking the Fordow nuclear facility at the behest of Israel is that it would slow down the Iranian threat, and continue to weaken Tehran’s position in the region. If Iran has a nuclear weapon, its neighboring rivals like the Saudis and the Emiratis would most certainly feel pressure to develop weapons of their own, and may prompt a nuclear arms race across the Middle East.
However, destroying nuclear facilities is merely a delay tactic. Critically, Iran has the nuclear knowledge. Israel can kill Iranian nuclear scientists and work with the US to destroy facilities and infrastructure, setting back Tehran’s timeline nuclear timeline. But it is impossible to destroy what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) terms the “continuity of knowledge,” the information stored, taught and distributed across the academic landscape.
It is also reasonable to assume Iran has nuclear facilities and supplies secreted away in other locations unknown to the US and Israel.
Israel’s real objective: regime change
While Israel’s prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu initially claimed the goal of the attacks was to eliminate the threat of Tehran’s nuclear program, reporting (and Israel’s actions targeting non-nuclear facilities such as civilian & energy infrastructure and military personnel) suggest otherwise.
Most notably, Israel reportedly presented the US with a credible plan to kill Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, which Trump rejected. One doesn’t plan to assassinate the leader of a sovereign nation, no matter how much he is viewed as a threat, without the goal of regime change.
The US has a history of problematic regime change operations
Regime change is a topic people love to pontificate on, but is much more difficult to successfully execute. One doesn’t simply magically overthrow a government and replace it with a new, gentler, less hostile version. Recent history is littered with examples of American-influenced regime change (see: Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya) turning out badly.
Back in 2020, the political scientist, and former Biden official, Philip Gordon, noted the US has a history in the postwar era of trying to remove governments in the Middle East. Yet every time it does so, it results in failure.
In every case but that of Syria (where the regime held on to power), the United States prematurely declared victory, failed to anticipate the chaos that would inevitably ensue after regime collapse, and ultimately found itself bearing massive human and financial costs for decades to come.
In the face of a US-led coalition, it took over a decade for the Assad government to fall in Syria, and the chaos and dislocation caused by Western-led efforts throughout the 2010s were responsible for major political turbulence across Europe.
It isn’t an overreach to say that America’s bogged down campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq helped foment a general global anti-US animus.
Indeed, Iran itself serves as another example of a botched effort. In the 1950s, the US helped overthrow Mohammad Mosaddegh (largely because of oil), backing the unpopular Shah. Twenty-five years later, Ayatollah Khomeini led the 1979 Revolution that deposed the Shah and installed the current government of the Islamic Republic.
Even if the Ayatollah were to be overthrown, who (or what) takes over? Would regime change even work in Iran?
The regime may be unpopular, as witnessed by the increasingly frequent protest movements that have sprung up in Iran, but there is no unified opposition that would immediately engender popular support. There is no reason to think a new government would be a liberal, pro-western democracy, especially after the onslaught of violence unleashed by the Israeli military and US bombs. At one end could be a nationalist military dictatorship, but deposing the Ayatollah could also create a leadership vacuum where sectarian divisions overwhelm, regional actors are pulled in, and chaos ensues.
Even if we assume a new, more benign government were to attain power, why would this new regime give up its nuclear program after Israel’s attack without receiving economic concessions?
Does Israel have a plan?
As the Lebanese reporter Kim Ghattas opines in the FT, Netanyahu has constantly exhibited a desire to keep going.
Over the past 20 months, Netanyahu has consistently refused to take the win — whether the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, the ceasefire in Lebanon, or overtures from Syria’s new leaders. Instead he has continued to strike Lebanon at will and hit Syria, while the rest of the region is actively helping both governments to stabilise and rebuild their nations. Israel has also seized a 400 sq km demilitarised buffer zone inside Syria, indefinitely.
Just like in Gaza, there is nothing to suggest Netanyahu has a strategy for what would happen if the government fell.
Perhaps he is hoping for Iranian capitulation. There is precedent for this: back in the 80s, Ayatollah Khomeini, the original Supreme Leader, reluctantly agreed to end the Iran-Iraq War, calling the decision “more deadly than drinking poison.”
But the opposite could also happen: an Iran committed to developing nuclear weapons under the guise of a deterrence.
The consequences of bombing Iran
According to recent US intelligence, if Trump pulls the trigger and launches a strike, Iran and its proxies (e.g., the Houthis and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria) are prepared to go after American troops and bases in the Middle East. The US has ~40k troops deployed across nearly two dozen bases in the Middle East that Iran could target.
The energy infrastructure of Gulf states allied to the US (e.g., Saudi Arabia) or the Strait of Hormuz could also be lined-up for attacks. Approximately 20mn barrels of oil-related exports transit the Strait daily, which Iran could quickly disrupt.
Another concern is Iranian-backed sleeper cells that operate around the world. What if they are given license to conduct strikes further afield? These groups might not act immediately, but this may activate long-term plans of retaliation.
Finally, what if Iran decides that a joint Israel-US attack justifies moving closer to a bomb? Based on reporting from The New York Times, that is a very real risk.
Senior U.S. intelligence officials said that Iranian leaders were likely to shift toward producing a bomb if the American military attacked the Iranian uranium enrichment site Fordo or if Israel killed Iran’s supreme leader.
Because, wouldn’t a US attack simply reinforce the basic idea behind developing a nuclear program, to have one as a deterrent against foreign interference?
What can the US do instead of bombing Iran?
Solution #1: A revised JCPOA
You know what had been working for a few years, allowing Iran to develop economically while easing the minds of the rest of the world that Tehran was not actively pursuing nuclear weapons? The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), where Tehran agreed to strict limits on its nuclear activities and gave inspectors access to monitor its activities in return for sanctions relief.
It’s notable that one of the most vocal critics of the JCPOA was Benjamin Netanyahu, who exclaimed in 2015 that “this is a bad deal - a very bad deal. We're better off without it.”
Yet despite Netanyahu’s objections, the IAEA issued over a dozen reports highlighting Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA. Even after Trump withdrew the US from the deal in 2018, Tehran still complied with much of the framework until after Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was assassinated in January 2020.
Yes, the JCPOA was time-bound, so theoretically Iran could start enriching and building up a uranium stockpile once the deal wrapped. But that is when you renegotiate and use the goodwill built up during the terms of the deal to extend the peace!
Ultimately, Trump’s decision to unilaterally withdraw the US from the deal, thanks to pressure from Netanyahu, despite no evidence suggesting Iran was in breach of the deal’s terms, has led to the current crisis. There is still time to rectify this, but engaging diplomatically may be an issue when Israel has killed key Iranian diplomats who had previously been involved in talks with the US.
That being said, Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s foreign minister and participant in the 2015 nuclear negotiations appears willing to continue to engage with the US in talks assuming, “Trump is genuine about diplomacy and interested in stopping this war.” Iran has requested Trump talk to Netanyahu and get Israel to stop its bombing campaign to demonstrate Trump’s willingness to negotiate, but Trump responded by saying that it is “very hard to make that request right now…If somebody is winning, it’s a little bit harder to do than if somebody is losing”
Solution #2: A regional nuclear consortium
One mooted path forward already on the table is a regional nuclear alliance. The US could help establish a regional coalition (including Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE) which collectively enriches uranium in a third country for the purposes of a civilian nuclear program, under the IAEA’s guidance. This would provide Iran access to low-enriched uranium for ostensibly peaceful purposes, while its location outside Iran and partnership with other regional actors, would help alleviate some of Israel’s worries about nuclear proliferation.
This plan would require acquiescence from US regional partners, but that should be attainable. While leaders in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman, for example, are no fans of the Ayatollah, they are more wary of a possible regional conflict on their doorstep, and the potential for spillover into their respective territory. Indeed, right now the Gulf nations are calling for restraint.
“The message from Arab states to Washington is simple and direct: We all want a peaceful, quiet, and moderate Middle East driven by business and economic interests,” says a Gulf diplomat with knowledge of the talks but who was not authorized to speak to the press. “This will all be lost if Israel and Iran continue the war. This conflict will undo all our painstaking progress towards stability, progress, and peace.”